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Traditional theories of decision-making assume that utilities are based on the intrinsic value 
of outcomes; in turn, these values depend on associations between expected outcomes 
and the current motivational state of the decision-maker. This view disregards the fact that 
humans (and possibly other animals) have prospection abilities, which permit anticipating future 
mental processes and motivational and emotional states. For instance, we can evaluate future 
outcomes in light of the motivational state we expect to have when the outcome is collected, 
not (only) when we make a decision. Consequently, we can plan for the future and choose 
to store food to be consumed when we expect to be hungry, not immediately. Furthermore, 
similarly to any expected outcome, we can assign a value to our anticipated mental processes 
and emotions. It has been reported that (in some circumstances) human subjects prefer to 
receive an unavoidable punishment immediately, probably because they are anticipating the 
dread associated with the time spent waiting for the punishment. This article offers a formal 
framework to guide neuroeconomic research on how prospection affects decision-making. 
The model has two characteristics. First, it uses model-based Bayesian inference to describe 
anticipation of cognitive and motivational processes. Second, the utility-maximization process 
considers these anticipations in two ways: to evaluate outcomes (e.g., the pleasure of eating 
a pie is evaluated differently at the beginning of a dinner, when one is hungry, and at the end of 
the dinner, when one is satiated), and as outcomes having a value themselves (e.g., the case of 
dread as a cost of waiting for punishment). By explicitly accounting for the relationship between 
prospection and value, our model provides a framework to reconcile the utility-maximization 
approach with psychological phenomena such as planning for the future and dread.
Keywords: prospection, model-based, Bayesian, goal-directed, anticipatory planning, dread, anticipation, forward model
linked to planning, which requires the mental generation and 
exploration of possible alternative courses of actions (or more 
generally future events).
It has been reported that the brain (e.g., the orbitofrontal 
cortex) represents subjective reward values during goal-directed 
decision-making (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008; Kable 
and Glimcher, 2007). However, why values are assigned to certain 
outcomes remains unclear. Recent computational models suggest 
that animals’ motivations are responsible for assigning specific 
utilities to outcomes. It follows that different motivational states 
may correspond to different utility functions. In this regard, Niv 
et al. (2006) define motivation as the mapping between outcomes 
and their utilities, and refer to “motivational states” (e.g., hunger 
or thirst) as indices of such different mappings, as one in which 
foods are mapped to high utilities, and another in which liquids 
are mapped to high utilities. This means that valuation is influ-
enced by both external factors, such as outcomes and their prob-
ability of occurrence, and the internal context (i.e., the motivational, 
emotional, and cognitive state) of the decision-maker. However, 
in this framework, only the external factors are explicitly repre-
sented by the decision-maker during planning; internal context 
influences utility assignment only indirectly, as it determines the 
utility function.
1 INTRODUCTION
In line with the expected utility theory (EUT), most economic and 
neuroeconomic models view decision-making as aimed at the 
maximization of expected utility (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1944). With regard to the computational processes involved in util-
ity assignment and choice, it has been proposed that the brain can 
use at least two instrumental controllers: a habitual mechanism, 
which retrieves the cached values of actions that have successfully 
led to reward in similar contexts, and a goal-directed mechanism, 
which explicitly calculates and compares the costs of actions and 
the values of their outcomes. Both mechanisms have been stud-
ied within the reinforcement learning (RL) framework (Sutton 
and Barto, 1998). Habitual and goal-directed controllers have 
been described with model-free and model-based RL methods, 
respectively (Daw et al., 2005). Both controllers (aim to) maximize 
reward, but the former (learns and) uses action–value associa-
tions, whereas the latter (learns and) uses action–outcome and 
outcome–value associations. Although these two systems co-exist 
and compete, the former tends to be selected only in simple envi-
ronments and after sufficient experience is acquired, whereas the 
latter is mostly selected in novel or more dynamic environments 
(Daw et al., 2005). Because they represent action–outcome transi-
tions explicitly, goal-directed controllers have been  traditionally 
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The aforementioned phenomena are surprising from the 
 perspective of economic theories that consider the utility of pros-
pects as depending only on the intrinsic value of outcomes. In this 
article, we propose a computational model that extends utility- 
maximization theories of decision-making to the case of agents 
provided with prospection abilities. Our key proposal is that the 
anticipation of future motivations, emotions, and, more generally, 
cognitive processes influences the “utility assignment” process, in 
two ways. First, anticipated future cognitive processes can affect 
the values of future outcomes (e.g., food will be rewarding only if 
we are hungry). Second, anticipated cognitive processes can have 
a value in themselves (e.g., dread has a negative value). In other 
words, on the one hand the ability of anticipating motivations 
permits evaluating future outcomes in relation to future internal 
contexts. On the other hand, anticipated emotions associated with 
prospects, such as fear, dread, and regret, can be treated by the 
decision-maker as “outcomes” themselves.
We explore these two aspects of the theory from a computa-
tional viewpoint, starting from the computational (Bayesian) 
model of decision-making proposed by Botvinick and collabora-
tors (Botvinick and An, 2008; Solway and Botvinick, submitted; see 
Section 2) and extending it with two critical features. In Section 3, we 
extend the model with a component for anticipating motivational 
dynamics (called motivational forward model), and test it in three 
scenarios in which utility related to future motivations has to be 
considered in the maximization of reward. This model highlights 
how the same utility-maximization framework can explain present-
directed and future-directed choices as dependent on considerations 
about current and expected motivations, respectively. In Section 
4 we extend the model by including the ability to assign a value 
to anticipated emotional states, and test it in a scenario in which 
choice has future negative emotional effects (dread) that have to be 
avoided in order to maximize reward. This model shows that, for an 
agent provided with prospection abilities, the influence of antici-
pated emotional factors on decision-making can be incorporated 
in an utility-maximization framework, rather than considered as an 
irrational phenomenon. In Section 5, we discuss the implications of 
our theory for neuroeconomics, and how our computational models 
can guide the study of the brain mechanisms implied in prospection 
abilities and associated decision-making processes.
2 THE “BASELINE MODEL”: A BAYESIAN MODEL OF GOAL-
DIRECTED DECISION-MAKING
The computational models we present extend the Bayesian model of 
goal-directed decision-making proposed by Botvinick and collabo-
rators (Botvinick and An, 2008; Solway and Botvinick, submitted; 
hereafter, the baseline model; see Figure 1), which we will introduce 
here. The authors use the formalism of Dynamic Bayesian Networks 
(Murphy, 2002) to represent the goal-directed computational pro-
cesses involved in solving Markov Decision Problems. In particular, 
they adopt a model-based approach, in which (stochastic) action–
outcome and outcome–utility transitions are represented explicitly.
Each node represents a discrete random variable and each arrow 
represents the conditional dependence between two random vari-
ables. The model shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 represents the 
unfolding of three time slices (time indexes are omitted), but the 
Dynamic Bayesian Networks formalism can be used to design 
This approach is successful in the case of outcomes collected 
immediately after choice, since the internal (e.g., motivational) 
context usually remains the same during the time between choice 
and delivery of reward. However, in the case of choices that involve 
delayed outcomes, the decision-maker’s motivation may change 
during the interval between choice and delivery, hence the value of 
outcomes may in turn change drastically when they are collected 
compared to when the choice is made. If an agent does not consider 
how contextual factors change, it risks obtaining less reward than 
expected (Loewenstein et al., 2003). For example, consider the fol-
lowing case: when you order a piece of pie at the beginning of a 
dinner, you are evaluating the pleasure you will receive on the basis 
of your current hunger, disregarding the fact that at the end of the 
meal you will be satiated. Eating the pie risks being far less reward-
ing than expected before, because there is an asymmetry between 
the value of the pie when you make the choice and when you eat it. 
To correctly evaluate future events, an agent must simulate future 
internal (motivational and cognitive) context as well as the future 
external environment (future outcomes).
Numerous researchers have investigated how humans (and pos-
sibly even some non-human animals) anticipate future internal 
contexts, specifically those related to future mental processes, such 
as motivational and emotional states. These abilities have been 
related to various concepts, including “mental time travel,” “epi-
sodic time travel,” “self-projection,” “prospection,” and “foresight.” 
For instance, prospection has been described as the ability to project 
the self into the future, connected to the episodic memory ability 
(Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Schacter et al., 2007); see also (Gilbert 
and Wilson, 2009) for a taxonomy of potential flaws in decision-
making associated with prospection abilities. In a similar vein, 
Suddendorf and Corballis (1997) describe mental time travel as 
combining prediction and episodic memory; see also Suddendorf 
(2006). This ability underlies prospective planning, or planning for 
future needs and circumstances that are independent of the current 
motivational and perceptual context. For example, we go to the 
supermarket even when we are not hungry, because we anticipate 
that we will be hungry at a later stage.
A second way prospection abilities affect decision-making is 
through anticipation of emotions. First, humans seem able to 
anticipate pleasure or displeasure associated with a future out-
come just by imagining it. This ability has been called pre-feeling 
(Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). Second, not only pre-feeling is trig-
gered by imagining future outcomes; emotions are also generated 
by imagining future cognitive processes associated to prospects 
that are unrelated to outcomes. For instance, we can choose not 
to achieve a desired goal because we anticipate that it will make us 
feel guilty, or that we will regret it. Recent neuroscientific research 
has focused on how anticipated emotions unrelated to outcomes 
change the utility of prospects. Coricelli et al. (2005) have stud-
ied how anticipating regret influences choice. Along similar lines, 
Berns et al. (2006) reported that subjects preferred to receive an 
electric shock immediately rather than after a given amount of 
time; in some cases, subjects preferred a stronger electric shock 
immediately rather than waiting for a weaker one. According to 
the experimenters, the subjects assigned negative utility to waiting, 
because they anticipated their negative emotional state during the 
waiting time.
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more details). For instance, in a double T-maze, which has the 
highest reward in its upper right corner, the selected policy will 
encode “go right twice.”
The baseline model successfully replicates data from many ani-
mal experiments, including devaluation (Balleine and Dickinson, 
1998), labyrinth navigation, latent learning, and detour behavior 
(Tolman, 1948), all of which are hallmarks of goal-directed behav-
ior. The authors of the model discuss how each of its components 
can be related to a brain subsystem. They propose that the policy 
system is implemented by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the 
action system is implemented by the premotor cortex and the sup-
plementary motor area, the state system by the medial temporal 
cortex, the medial frontal/parietal cortex and the caudate nucleus, 
and, finally, the reward system is associated with the orbitofrontal 
cortex and the basolateral amygdala.
Following an approach that is typical of RL architectures, the 
baseline model assigns values to outcomes based on the current 
motivational state of the agent. When the motivational state 
changes, the utility function changes accordingly and new utility 
values are assigned; see also Niv et al. (2006). However, the agent is 
unable to anticipate its future motivational states. In the next sec-
tion, we describe an extension of the baseline model that can take 
both present and future motivational states into account during 
the utility-maximization process.
3 ANTICIPATING MOTIVATIONS
In order to describe how anticipating motivation influences 
decision-making, our proposal extends the baseline model (see 
Table 2; Figure 2) by considering both future and current motiva-
tional states. To do this, our model includes a novel component, a 
models of arbitrary length. The variables adopted by the baseline 
model are presented in Table 1: state (s) variables represent the set 
of world states; action (a) variables represent the set of available 
actions; policy (p) variables represent the set of actions associ-
ated with a specific state; finally, utility (u) variables represent the 
utility function corresponding to a given state. Rather than view-
ing utility as a continuous variable, the baseline model adopts an 
approach introduced by Cooper (1988) in which utility is repre-
sented through the probability of a binary variable. The following 
linear transformation maps from scalar reward values to p(u/s
i
)
p u s
R s
r
r max R si
i
max
max j j/
( )
, ( )( ) = +

 =
1
2
1 | |
 
(1)
In situations involving sequential actions, this model uses a 
technique proposed by Shachter and Peot (1992) which allows 
integrating all rewards in a single representation. This is achieved 
by introducing a global utility (u
G
) variable:
p u
N
p uG i
i
( ) = ( )∑1
 
(2)
where N is the number of u nodes.
Within this model, the utility of alternative courses of action 
(e.g., a navigation episode in a labyrinth with different rewards 
in its branches) can be calculated and maximized by a form of 
probabilistic inference called reward query. In short, the aggregated 
utility node u
G
 is set to one (its maximum value). Then, a standard 
probabilistic inference algorithm (belief propagation, Pearl, 2000) 
is used to compute the posterior probabilities of the policy nodes p. 
This process is iterated by replacing the prior probability of p with 
the posterior probability and repeating the inference procedure. 
The result of reward query is that the optimal policy is computed 
(see Botvinick and An, 2008; Solway and Botvinick, submitted for 
FIGURE 1 | The Bayesian model of goal-directed decision-making 
proposed by Botvinick and An (2008); Solway and Botvinick (submitted), 
which we use as our “baseline model.” See main text for explanation.
FIGURE 2 | Bayesian model of anticipated motivation. The motivational 
forward model is inside the box. See main text for explanation.
Table 1 | List of variables used in Figure 1.
Node Variable Values
p Policy [p
1
,…, p
n
]
a Actions [a
1
,…, a
n
]
s States [s
1
,…, s
n
]
u Utilities [0, 1]
u
G
 Aggregated utility [0, 1]
Table 2 | List of variables used in Figure 2.
Node Variable Values
p Policy [p
1
,…, p
15
] (state × action)
a Actions [left, right, straight]
s Spatial states [S1,…, S5]
d Detection states [0,…, 4] (no reward,…, max. reward)
i Internal states [0,…, 4] (no drive,…, max. drive)
u Utilities [0, 1]
u
G
 Aggregated utility [0, 1]
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nodes for each time step: u
H
 and u
T
, for hunger and thirst, respec-
tively. All utility nodes at all time steps are summed in the global 
utility node (u
G
), as in the baseline model.
Considering hunger as a paradigmatic example, “internal state 
nodes” can assume five values: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 (0 indicates no hunger 
and 4 maximum hunger). Similarly “detection nodes” can assume 
five values: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 (0 indicates no food detected and 4 maximum 
food detected). Spatial state values represent positions in a maze 
and can assume five values in the experiments (S
1
 to S
5
). Action 
values are: “left,” “right,” and “straight.” Policy values correspond to 
the combination between action and state values. The conditional 
probabilities of all nodes are deterministic, except p(u/i,d). This 
implies that if the agent is in a certain position in the maze and 
makes a certain action, it will go deterministically to another given 
position. Similarly, if the agent is in a certain position and follows a 
given policy, it will always make a certain action. The relationship 
between spatial states and actions depends on the maze configura-
tion (see below).
The value of the nodes in the motivational forward model 
(of each motivation) are calculated as follows: the value of a 
detection state depends deterministically on the associated spa-
tial state at that time step (i.e., specifically on the amount of 
potential reward present in the corresponding position of the 
maze, see below). The value of the internal state is the difference 
between the value of the internal state at the previous time-step 
minus the value of the detection state at the previous time step 
(if the former is greater than the latter; otherwise it is zero). This 
motivational forward model that represents explicitly motivational 
dynamics, which permits an agent to anticipate its motivational 
states.
In short, the agent is provided with a simplified homeostatic sys-
tem (or a system that monitors internal variables that are significant 
for the survival of the agent), which includes one or more drives, 
such as hunger, thirst, or sex (Hull, 1943). The motivational forward 
model explicitly represents the dynamics of the agent’s homeostatic 
system. Specifically, future motivational states depend jointly on the 
previous motivational state and on whether (and to what extent) 
the agent has been satiated or not at the previous time steps.
In the model of anticipated motivation, state nodes are broken 
down into sub-nodes: spatial states (s), which represent the spatial 
position, internal states (i) which represent the motivational state, 
and detection states (d), which record the presence of potential 
rewards. Different motivations, such as hunger and thirst, have 
separate motivational state nodes and detection state nodes. For 
each motivation, the spatial state influences the detection state. In 
other words, if the food is in a given place, the agent must be in that 
place (spatial state) to detect it (detection state). The detection state, 
together with the internal state, influences the internal state at the 
following time step. For example, at t
1
 the agent is hungry (internal 
state) and is in the food place (spatial state). Once the agent detects 
(detection state) and eats the food, at t
2
 it is less hungry (inter-
nal state at time t
2
 is lowered). The motivational forward models 
explicitly represent these transitions, permitting us to infer that, 
for instance, if at t
x
 I am hungry (internal state) and I see and eat 
a certain amount of food (detection state), than at t
x+1
 I am going 
to be less hungry (proportionally to the amount of food eaten).
Compared to standard RL models, in the model of anticipated 
motivation the ability to anticipate motivations changes the way 
utility is assigned. At each time step, utility u depends jointly on the 
motivational state i and on the potential reward detected d. Each 
motivation has its own associated utility node u. As in the baseline 
model, utility is represented as the conditional probability of the 
binary variable p(u/i,d).
It is worth noting that although the baseline model could in 
principle account for motivational dynamics by adding motiva-
tional variables to the state s, the substantial difference in factoring 
the graph in the way we propose is that it results in different implied 
conditional dependence relationships between the parts of the (fac-
torized) state: spatial state versus detection and internal states. Not 
only does this factorization influence how inference is performed in 
the graphical model, it also makes explicit claims about the mutual 
dependencies among components, which is essential for mapping 
formal models into psychological and neural hypotheses.
3.1 EXPERIMENTS: METHODS AND RESULTS
We tested the model of anticipated motivation in three simu-
lated scenarios. Because we considered the case of an agent with 
two motivations (hunger and thirst), the model includes two 
separate sets of nodes for internal states [hunger (h) and thirst 
(t)] and detection states [food (f) and water (w)]; see Table 3 
and Figure 3.
At every time step, the internal node and the detection node 
of each motivation jointly influence the corresponding utility, as 
described in the general model. Thus, the model has two utility 
Table 3 | List of variables used in Figure 3.
Node Variable Value
p Policy [p
1
,…, p
15
 (state × action)]
a Actions [left, right, straight]
s Spatial states [S1,…, S5]
f Food detection states [0,…, 4] (no food,…, max. food)
h Hunger internal states [0,…, 4] (no hunger,…, max. hunger)
w Water detection states [0,…, 4] (no water,…, max. water)
t Thirst internal states [0,…, 4] (no thirst,…, max. thirst)
u
H
 Utility for hunger [0, 1]
u
T
 Utility for thirst [0, 1]
u
G
 Aggregated utility [0, 1]
FIGURE 3 | The model of anticipated motivations adopted in the 
simulations, which includes two drives, that is, hunger and thirst, and 
two motivational forward models.
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3.1.1 Experiment 1: strategic planning
Humans and other animals can act impulsively or strategically. In 
the former case, they assign outcome values only according to their 
current preponderant motivational state. In the latter case, they 
consider a complex prospect of future motivational states and cor-
responding future rewards. The ability to choose “reflexive” strate-
gies might be more advantageous in complex environments. We 
argue that a motivational forward model might underlie the ability 
to assign values according to future motivations, which in turn 
might lead to selecting courses of actions that maximize reward 
in the long run.
To test this idea, we designed a simulated experiment in which 
an agent has to choose between two alternatives: a smaller reward, 
which satisfies its immediate preponderant motivation (e.g., hun-
ger), and a larger reward, which also satisfies the weaker motivation 
(e.g., thirst) by postponing the satisfaction of the preponderant 
one. We hypothesized that in this condition an agent provided 
with the motivational forward model would be able to maximize 
its reward, whereas an agent without such a mechanism would 
select less rewarding, impulsive behavior aimed at satisfying only 
the preponderant motivation.
The experimental design is illustrated by the T-maze shown in 
Figure 4A. We considered three time steps: at t
0
 the agent is in S
1
; 
at t
1
 it can go left to S
2
 or right to S
3
; at t
2
 it goes from S
2
 to S
4
 and 
from S
3
 to S
5
. In each of the five positions of the T-maze, a certain 
accounts for the fact that hunger is decreased by eating (to the 
same degree as the value of the food eaten). When the value of 
the internal state at the previous time step is zero, the successive 
value is raised by 2; this represents the increased hunger associ-
ated with the passage of time. Finally, the value of internal state 
and detection state jointly determine the conditional probabil-
ity of the utility corresponding to that motivation. Because we 
model potential rewards that have only positive values in our 
experiments, utilities range from neutral [p(u = 1/i,d) = 0] and 
maximally positive [p(u = 1/i,d) = 1]. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to model a continuum of negative and positive utilities, as in the 
baseline model, in which negative utilities range between 0 and 
0.5, and positive utilities between 0.5 and 1. In our experiments 
the probability p(u = 1/i,d) is the lowest one between the detec-
tion state and the internal state, over 4. For example, if potential 
reward detected is 2 and motivation is 0, then p(u = 1/i,d) = 0/4; 
if motivation is 1, then p(u = 1/i,d) = 1/4; if motivation is 2 and 
potential reward is 4, then p(u = 1/i,d) = 2/4.
Anticipating motivations provides several advantages to an 
agent. Below we describe three simulated experiments that are 
intended to test three abilities: (1) strategic planning, or disregard-
ing currently available rewards in favor of higher future ones; (2) 
considering future motivational switches in the planning process; 
(3) planning for the future, such as storing food in view of future 
needs.
FIGURE 4 | Experiment 1. (A) T-maze. Symbols represent values of detection 
states and internal states that are computed during the inference process by the 
agent that anticipates motivation. Potential reward pattern (corresponding to 
potential reward in each position of the maze) and initial motivational states 
(corresponding to motivational states in S2 and S3) are set by the experimenter, all 
further information is computed by reward query. Red forms indicate motivational 
values that are satiated by consumption of potential rewards in the corresponding 
position of the maze. Graphically, optimal behavior corresponds with choosing the 
path with the largest number of red forms. (B,C) Results of the first experiment 
(B) agent with anticipated motivations; (C) baseline model. The graph represents 
the probability assigned to the policy associated to “going right” (red) and “going 
left” (green), respectively, at each iteration of the reward query.
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our model, because we modeled only the goal-directed aspects of 
choice. However, they would be necessary in more sophisticated 
models that include multiple cognitive controllers that interact and 
compete (Daw et al., 2005; Rigoli et al., 2011).
3.1.2 Experiment 2: considering future motivational switches
The ability to predict future motivations permits taking future 
changes of motivations into account during the planning process. 
In turn, this permits predicting that a future outcome will be more 
or less rewarding, depending on the future motivational context. In 
keeping with our previous assumptions, we argue that the motiva-
tional forward model could be a key mechanism for maximizing 
reward in situations in which the internal motivational context can 
change before the outcome is delivered.
To test this idea, we designed a simulated experiment in which 
an agent has to choose between two alternatives: a path in which 
the cumulative reward is higher given the current motivation, and 
a path in which the cumulative reward is higher if one considers 
how its motivations will change. We hypothesized that an agent 
provided with the motivational forward model would be able to 
maximize its reward, whereas an agent without such mechanism 
would tend to choose the path associated with higher rewards for 
its current motivation.
The T-maze in Figure 5, left, illustrates the set-up. Here poten-
tial reward has the following pattern: food 3 in S
2
 and S
3
; food 4 
in S
4
; water 2 in S
5
. The initial internal states were: H
1
 = 4; T
1
 = 0. 
According to our hypothesis, if a hungry agent (H
1
 = 4) predicts 
that in the near future it will be satiated (i.e., it will collect food = 3), 
it can choose future potential rewards that at the moment seem 
amount of food, water, or both can be found. The configuration 
chosen in our simulation is the following: food 3 in S
2
, water 2 in S
3
, 
food 3 in S
4
, and food 3 in S
5
. Then we set the initial internal states 
as follows: H
1
 = 4, T
1
 = 2.
The agent provided with anticipatory motivations is imple-
mented using the graphical model shown in Table 3 and Figure 3. 
In the experiment, it is compared with the baseline model (shown 
in Table 1 and Figure 1) in which utility is assigned only to rewards 
that are congruent with the highest of the actual motivational states 
of the agent (hunger in this case).
Figures 4B,C, shows the results of the experiment (Figure 4B 
agent with anticipated motivations; Figure 4C baseline model). 
The two graphs show that, for the agent provided with anticipated 
motivations, the probability of selecting the “going right” policy 
increases monotonically toward one at every iteration of the reward 
query. By going right, the agent satisfies both thirst (at the second 
step) and hunger (at the third step). On the contrary, the base-
line model, which takes into account only its present motivational 
state (in this case hunger is higher than thirst), selects an impulsive 
behavior and goes left toward the immediate maximum amount of 
reward corresponding to its actual motivation.
Our first simulation describes the motivational forward model 
as an essential element for the goal-directed ability of shifting 
from impulsive strategies to more “reflexive” ones. Note however 
that strategic planning plausibly requires additional mechanisms 
to exert cognitive control and inhibit prepotent responses (dic-
tated by habitual or Pavlovian mechanisms) before the goal-
directed utility-maximization process is completed (Barkley, 2001; 
Botvinick et al., 2001). These mechanisms are not implemented in 
FIGURE 5 | Experiment 2. (A) T-maze. (B,C) Results [(A) agent with anticipated motivations; (B) baseline model], “going right” = red; “going left” = green.
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suggesting that they are able to flexibly account for their future 
motivational states (although it is unclear if they use the same 
mechanisms as humans, see below).
Our third simulation is conceptually similar to the study of Raby 
et al. (2007), which aimed to assess the ability of scrub-jays to store 
potential rewards in view of future motivational states. The authors 
report that scrub-jays cached food only when they expected future 
deprivation, suggesting that they consider their future motivations 
and plan for the future.
The scenario is illustrated in the T-maze of Figure 6: at t
0
 the 
agent is in S
1
; at t
1
 it can go left (to S
2
) or right (to S
3
); at t
2
 it goes 
from S
2
 to S
4
 and from S
3
 to S
5
. Once a potential reward is detected, 
the agent has two options: to consume it immediately or to consume 
it later, that is, at the following time steps. Crucially, in our model 
of anticipated motivation, once the agent detects potential rewards 
but is not motivated, and at the same time it anticipates that it will 
be motivated in the future, it stores them (as represented by the 
padlock symbol in Figure 6). We positioned the following potential 
rewards: food 3 in S
2
 and water 1 in S
3
, and set the initial internal 
state values to H
1
 = 0 and T
1
 = 1 (as shown in Figure 6, left). By 
going right, an agent can collect a small reward immediately (water). 
Instead, by going left and storing food (which is automatic in our 
model if the agent is not currently motivated and anticipates its 
future hunger) it can collect a higher reward at the next time step, 
when it will be hungry (note that in our model if a motivational 
state value is 0 at t
i
 it becomes 2 at t
i+1
).
Performance of our model of anticipated motivation is shown 
in Figure 6B. According to our prediction, the agent chooses 
to go left, storing a large amount of food and eating it later, 
lower (water = 2 rather than food = 4) but that will be higher when 
the agent is satiated (remember that in our model if a motivational 
state value is 0 at t
i
 it will be 2 at t
i+1
). Our results show that the 
agent provided with anticipatory motivations maximizes utility.
Note that our set-up is conceptually similar to the experiment 
conducted by Naqshbandi and Roberts (2006), in which squirrel 
monkeys could eat either four dates or one date. Given that eat-
ing dates makes monkeys thirsty, experimenters manipulated the 
delay between the meal and the availability of water. In the one 
date case, water was available sooner with respect to the four dates 
case. Although the monkeys chose four dates at the beginning, they 
gradually shifted their preference toward one date. It should be 
noted, however, that the interpretation of this experiment is contro-
versial, as it is still unclear whether the choice was goal-directed or 
induced by simpler mechanisms (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2008).
3.1.3 Experiment 3: planning for the future
According to the Bischof-Kohler’s hypothesis (Suddendorf and 
Corballis, 1997), only humans act in a complex and flexible way to 
achieve rewards in view of future motivations, even if not motivated 
at the present moment (e.g., going to the supermarket even when 
not hungry). Contrary to this idea, Raby et al. (2007) argued that 
even some other animals such as western scrub-jays (Aphelocoma 
californica) have this ability. In this work, experimenters taught 
scrub-jays to foresee conditions in which they would receive no 
food and thus be hungry; after this learning phase, experimenters 
unexpectedly gave the scrub-jays the chance to cache food. As a 
result, scrub-jays cached a larger amount of food when they foresaw 
a future condition of deprivation compared to other conditions, 
FIGURE 6 | Experiment 3. (A) T-maze. (B,C) Results [(A) agent with anticipated motivations; (B) baseline model], “going right” = red; “going left” = green.
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In relation to this debate, our proposed model of anticipated 
motivation describes both human and animal foresight abilities in 
terms of a motivational forward model. This mechanism, which 
projects only some internal states (motivation variables) in the 
future, could be a rudimental ability of “mental time travel” shared 
by some animals. Nevertheless, unlike the animal brain the human 
brain might project other internal variables and possibly episodic 
information into the future and, thus, obtain a more accurate esti-
mate of the self in the future. Enhanced prospection abilities could 
then determine qualitative (and perhaps phenomenological) differ-
ences between humans and animals, and at the same time maintain 
continuity from the simpler control architectures of our remote 
ancestors to our more sophisticated cognitive abilities (Pezzulo and 
Castelfranchi, 2007, 2009; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010).
Regarding the neural mechanisms involved in foresight, we 
hypothesize that variables in the model of anticipated motivation 
might be related to two distinct brain processes. The former process 
may be related to more abstract mechanisms of generating future 
prospects (linked to sensorimotor and motivational forward model 
nodes) and inhibiting preponderant responses triggered by reac-
tive systems (not implemented in our model), and might be con-
nected to areas such as dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and cingulate 
cortex. The latter process (associated with utility nodes) might be 
linked to the activation of “as-if” motivations (Damasio, 1994) 
and hence may involve cortico-limbic structures directly related to 
motivations themselves, such as the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, 
parahippocampal gyrus, and anterior fusiform gyrus (LaBar et al., 
2001). These two processes may be connected as follows: cortical 
anterior structures may modulate the activation of cortico-limbic 
structures related to simulated motivations. In other words, antici-
pation of future needs might partially activate brain structures 
associated to those needs and motivations. For instance, even if 
my homeostatic system does not currently require food intake, 
thinking about the next Christmas dinner triggers my hunger. As 
the ability to imagine future hunger may be similar to hunger itself, 
it might activate the same brain areas activated when desiring food 
in a hungry state.
4 ANTICIPATING COGNITIVE AND EMOTIONAL PROCESSES
In addition to motivational processes, cognitive, and emotional 
processes in general can be anticipated during decision-making. 
Indeed, a central point of theories of prospection and mental time 
travel is that an agent can project itself into the future, possibly 
with the same level of detail as episodic memory. Therefore, not 
only it can simulate future events, but also what it will think, pay 
attention to and feel in these future events. In turn, the value of 
these simulated cognitive and emotional states can be considered 
in the reward-maximization process of decision-making.
Although it is still unclear how the evaluation of simulated cog-
nitive and emotional states is implemented in the brain, recent 
research suggests that the simulation of future events elicits at least 
two kinds of affective processes. First, just imagining a reward or 
punishment is sufficient to elicit a feeling congruent to the one elic-
ited by the occurrence of that reward or punishment, a so called pre-
feeling (Breiter et al., 2001; Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). For instance, 
when one imagines the joy associated with a future event (e.g., 
winning a match) it can pre-feel joy. Rick and Loewenstein (2008) 
instead of immediately drinking a bit of water. In other words, 
rather than selecting the prepotent response of consuming the 
immediate reward (water, because it is a little thirsty), it is able 
to choose the action sequence that leads to higher reward in the 
future. On the contrary, the baseline agent (Figure 6C) behaves 
impulsively. The fact that the probability of going right increases 
toward one indicates that the baseline agent is attracted only 
by the immediate reward, and is unable to plan instrumental 
actions leading to the future consumption of a larger amount 
of reward.
3.2 DISCUSSION
In this section, we have presented a Bayesian model of goal-directed 
behavior that accounts for future motivations during planning. 
Our model includes a motivational forward model that permits 
evaluating outcomes as related to future rather than only current 
motivations, as is common in RL models (Sutton and Barto, 1998). 
Indeed, within the RL framework, it has been proposed that moti-
vations change the utility function (Niv et al., 2006). By contrast, 
in our model motivations are explicitly represented and influence 
the value of future potential rewards. Specifically, utility values of 
outcomes depend jointly on potential reward amount and on moti-
vation at the corresponding time, rather than only on the former. 
Another aspect that distinguishes our model from most RL models 
is the consideration of multiple motivational dynamics integrated 
in a unitary utility-maximization process.
In three simulated scenarios, in which choices had distal impli-
cations, we show that an agent that anticipates its motivational 
dynamics is able to gain more reward than an agent that only con-
siders its current motivational state. We propose that the compu-
tational mechanism responsible for the prediction of motivational 
dynamics, the motivational forward model, could be an essential 
(though not sufficient) element for the implementation of complex 
prospection abilities such as planning for the future.
The debate on how human and non-human brains represent 
future motivations during planning is still controversial. Both Raby 
et al. (2007) and Osvath and Osvath (2008) report evidence suggest-
ing that animals have foresight abilities (but see Suddendorf and 
Corballis, 2008 for concerns relative to these results). The former 
study shows that scrub-jays cached food only when they expected a 
future condition of deprivation. The latter study shows that chim-
panzees and orangutans flexibly chose a tool for future use taking 
future needs into account.
Despite these demonstrations that, at least in some circum-
stances, some animals plan in view of future needs, whether or 
not they adopt the same mechanisms as humans is still con-
troversial. Suddendorf and Corballis (1997, 2007) proposed the 
“mental time travel hypothesis” to interpret the human ability 
to anticipate motivations. According to that hypothesis, only 
humans can mentally simulate past and future circumstances 
from a subjective perspective in a vivid and flexible manner; 
other animals might use simpler methods, which include some 
anticipation of motivations but lack the vividness and richness 
of human experience. While mental time travel might be linked 
to episodic memory, animals rudimental ability to anticipate 
future motivations might be linked to semantic memory (Raby 
and Clayton, 2009).
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processes connected to pain modulation, the authors hypothesized 
that dread involves attentional phenomena as well as emotional 
ones. Nevertheless, how attentional and emotional processes are 
integrated in planning processes related to utility-maximization 
is still unknown.
In keeping with (Loewenstein, 1987), we argue that subjects 
use prospection abilities to anticipate their cognitive and emo-
tional processes while they wait for the punishment (see Caplin 
and Leahy, 2001 for a related view). The effects of dread on choice 
can be explained by two processes: the anticipation of directing 
future attention toward punishment and the emotional reaction 
to this anticipation (dread), which in turn may influence the util-
ity values of prospects. The influence of these two processes may 
be proportional to delay, namely to how long the agent believes it 
will pay attention to the outcome and pre-feel dread2. Following 
this logic, in Berns et al.’s (2006) experiment, subjects might not 
only pre-feel dread, but also anticipate that they will pre-feel the 
same way until they receive the shock, because they will be aware 
and pay attention to the feared outcome (the incoming pain) for 
the entire time preceding punishment. Considering a prospect 
characterized by these future cognitive and emotional states, all of 
which are negative, the cost of waiting sums up to the shock pre-
feeling, proportionally to delay of its occurrence. This is where a 
cost for waiting comes from. This anticipation of future attention 
processes might activate areas of posterior pain matrix linked to 
attention modulation, such as caudal cingulate cortex and posterior 
insula, which in turn might increase pre-feeling (dread), possibly 
causing the activation of areas associated with the perception of 
pain, namely SI and SII.
As we have discussed, dread is just one of the many examples of 
how anticipated cognitive and emotional processes affect decision-
making. Indeed, the anticipation of cognitive and emotional states 
is a multifaceted process, which plausibly involves several brain 
areas. However, we argue that it is possible to identify common 
(computational-level) principles for studying how anticipated 
cognitive and emotional states are elicited and how in turn they 
affect choice. In particular, the projection of the self in the future, 
the anticipation of cognitive and emotional factors and the focus 
on salient events might also play a role besides dread when behav-
ior is influenced by anticipated emotion. For example, we tend to 
overestimate the happiness or sadness caused by a future event, say 
winning a lottery or becoming paraplegic (Ubel et al., 2003; Gilbert 
and Wilson, 2009). The fact that we overestimate the time we will 
spend in a positive or negative emotional state might be one cause 
of this phenomenon. A third example is that of anticipated regret 
(Coricelli et al., 2007). It has been reported that subjects can decide 
argued that the reason why pre-feelings are elicited automatically 
is that they can be used as proxies when making decisions in which 
it is impossible to calculate action outcomes or associated rewards 
exactly. When action effects are difficult to predict or “intangi-
ble,” people can, instead, use more tangible anticipated emotions 
to decide among alternative options (see also Damasio, 1994 for 
a similar view on how pre-feelings are used as proxies to evaluate 
an imagined situation).
Second, anticipating prospects can trigger different emotions 
from those elicited by outcomes, but strictly related to them. For 
instance, the anticipation of a future loss can elicit frustration, dis-
appointment or regret, and the anticipation of pain can elicit fear 
or rage1. The adaptive value of such anticipatory emotions could be 
related to preparatory processes aimed at approaching or avoiding 
salient outcomes; for instance, fear could help in preparing to deal 
with future dangers (e.g., predators).
As prospection elicits pre-feelings and anticipatory emotions, 
the value of the latter becomes part of the decision-making pro-
cess. The fact that anticipation of emotions influences decision-
making is incompatible with economic theories that disregard 
psychological variables in modeling value assignment. This fact 
has recently been acknowledged by different areas of research that 
aim to develop novel theories of decision-making that incorporate 
the role of anticipated emotions within EUT (see e.g., Caplin and 
Leahy, 2001; Mellers and McGraw, 2001; Coricelli et al., 2007).
One condition in which anticipated emotions influence 
 decision-making is intertemporal choices. Traditional intertem-
poral choice models (such as discounted utility theory, an extension 
of EUT) assume that human and non-human animals exponen-
tially discount the utility assigned to outcomes as a function of 
their delayed presentation. As a consequence, agents should pre-
fer immediate rewards to delayed ones and vice versa in the case 
of punishment. Contrary to this hypothesis, Loewenstein (1987) 
found that, at least in some circumstances, participants preferred 
to receive shock immediately rather than wait a few more seconds 
for a postponed shock of the same voltage. Furthermore, the more 
participants were asked to wait, the more they were affected by 
the (negative) pre-feelings, suggesting that they were assigning a 
(negative) value to the passage of time.
The same scenario was studied in an fMRI experiment (Berns 
et al., 2006). This study reveals the existence of neural bases of 
dread, or the anticipated neural representation of punishment, 
which might be located in the posterior elements of the cortical 
pain matrix (SI, SII, the posterior insula, and the caudal cingulate 
cortex). The activity of these brain areas is proportional to time 
delay of the shock. Furthermore, “extreme dreaders,” or participants 
whose subjective feeling of dread was particularly significant, pre-
ferred receiving a higher voltage rather than waiting, which shows 
that the cost of waiting was higher than the cost associated with 
the difference in voltage. As the posterior pain matrix, that is, the 
brain area associated with dread, is usually involved in attentional 
2Although here we assume that self-projection is relative to all future states preceding 
the electric shock, in general simulations of future events need not be complete, but 
more likely focus on selected, salient events. This aspect is captured in our model in 
two ways: first, the granularity of states can be arbitrary; second, not all states are 
considered in the computation of utility, only those having higher valence. Although 
simulating only salient events is more parsimonious, at the same time it could de-
termine biases about how the imagined situation is evaluated, causing misbehavior 
(Gilbert and Wilson, 2009). In addition, it can produce different evaluations depen-
ding on when the future event is simulated. For instance, the effects of dread can be 
mitigated in the case of outcomes that are far away in time, because the imagined 
event is not judged as salient, and increase when it approaches; for example, this 
could be true for exam fear, which increases as the exam date approaches.
1A third potential mechanism could be a “cold” anticipation that an emotion will 
result from a choice; for instance, one can anticipate that it will regret a decision 
without actually feeling regret. We do not discuss this issue here; (see Castelfranchi 
and Miceli, 2011) for a more detailed analysis of the relations between anticipation 
and emotional processes.
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Once imagined states are introduced, they can be associated 
with utilities (as real states are). At every time step, both real state 
nodes and imagined state nodes have a corresponding utility 
node, respectively called (utility of) feelings (u
F
) and (utility of) 
pre-feelings (u
P
). Both can range between 0 and 1, as in baseline 
model (values between 0 and 0.5 correspond to punishments). 
In other words, anticipating both real and fictitious experience 
influences the estimated values of prospects. All utility nodes are 
summed up by u
G
.
Similarly to baseline model, this model maximizes expected 
utility by computing the optimal policy through reward query.
4.2 EXPERIMENTS: METHODS AND RESULTS
4.2.1 Experiment 4: dread
To test our model, we designed an experimental scenario that is 
conceptually similar to that in Berns et al.’s (2006) study. These 
authors found that people prefer immediate electric shock rather 
than a postponed shock at the same (or even minor) level of inten-
sity, and linked this preference to the anticipation of pain. The 
scenario is schematized in Figure 8.
Similar to the previous experiments, we represented the deci-
sion-making scenario as a T-maze in which punishment is posi-
tioned in one branch at the beginning and in the other branch at 
the end (see Figure 8A). Like in previous simulations, all transi-
tions are deterministic except for utility assignment. We consider 
three time steps: at t
0
 the agent is in S
1
; after 5 s (t
1
) it can go left 
to S
2
 or right to S
3
; after 20 s (t
2
) it goes to S
4
 from S
2
 and to S
5
 
from S
3
. We positioned two punishments with the same felt value 
F = −5, one in S
2
 (at t
1
 = 5) the other in S
5
 (at t
2
 = 20). As stated 
above, at every time step, the imagined state value is equal to the 
following real state value associated to the maximum absolute 
value of punishment compared to all other future states. Indeed, 
at t
0
, if the agent imagines going left, is
0
 is influenced by s
1
 node 
because punishment is found at t
1
 (the value of is
0
 is influenced 
by the position in the maze S
2
). If the agent imagines going right, 
is
0
 is influenced by s
2
 node because punishment is found at t
2
 (the 
value of is
0
 is influenced by the position in the maze S
5
). Finally, 
at t
1
, is
1
 node is influenced by s
2
: going left, the value of is
1
 is 
influenced by the position in the maze S
4
; going right, the value 
of is
1
 is influenced by the position in the maze S
5
. Pre-felt values 
associated to every imagined state are a function of F and time 
to punishment [P = f(F,t)]. We adopted Loewenstein’s (1987) 
model to calculate the pre-felt values. Given the instantaneous 
intensity of dread (a = 0.05) as constant, the pre-felt value during 
the interval t
j
–t
j−1
 is:
P F t tj j= −( )−a 1  (3)
Going left, during t
1
 − t
0
, P1 5 0 05 5 0 1 25= − ⋅ ⋅ − =. ( ) , ; during 
t
2
 − t
1
, P2 0 0 05 20 5 0= ⋅ ⋅ − =. ( ) . Going right, during t1 − t0, P1 is the 
same as going left; but during t
2
 − t
1
, P2 5 0 05 20 5 3 75= − ⋅ ⋅ − =. ( ) , .  
Total dread (D = ΣP) is respectively D
left
 = 1,25, D
right
 = 4.
Results of the simulation are shown in Figure 8B. In accordance 
with Berns et al.’s (2006) findings, the agent chooses to go left and 
to receive the shock as early as possible, in order to avoid the “costs 
of waiting” (i.e., the pre-feelings associated to the states in which 
it self-projects).
not to pursue a given course of actions because they anticipate they 
will regret it if it results in a loss. In this case, they might anticipate 
ruminating on the decision-making process itself, being attentive 
to the alternative choices they discarded, which might also elicit 
an uncomfortable emotional state (regret).
In the rest of this section, we will propose a computational model 
that extends the baseline model by incorporating the anticipation of 
cognitive and emotional processes along the lines we have sketched 
here; then, we will test it in the paradigmatic case of dread.
4.1 COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
In order to account for the ability to project oneself into the future, 
so as to anticipate cognitive and emotional processes, we have added 
an additional set of nodes to the baseline model: imagined states (is). 
The resulting model is shown in Table 4 and Figure 7. Imagined 
states represent salient information the agent expects to focus on. 
In other words, the agent anticipates that at time t it will focus its 
cognitive and attentive resources on the state of the world repre-
sented by the imagined state is
t
.
Imagined states depend on the value of one or more real states 
(s), specifically the ones associated with the higher reward or pun-
ishment value. In this way, we implicitly assume that people antici-
pate paying attention to states having strong emotional value. These 
can be future states, as in the case of dread or anticipation of future 
punishment, meaning that is
t
 corresponds to a future real state s
t+n
. 
Or they can be past states, as in the case of regret, meaning that is
t
 
corresponds to a past real state s
t−n
.
Table 4 | List of variables used in Figure 7.
Node Variable Value
pi Policy [pi1,…, pi15 (state × action)]
a Actions [left, right, straight]
s Spatial states [S1,…, S5]
is Imagined state [IS1,…, IS5]
f Feeling [0, 1]
p Pre-feeling [0, 1]
u
G
 Aggregated utility [0, 1]
FIGURE 7 | Bayesian model of anticipated emotions.
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of dread. Finally, because dread requires the ability to project com-
plex information about the self into the future (e.g., anticipation 
of the focus of cognitive and attention resources) in our model, 
we expect that non-human animals will not be prone to dread.
We have suggested that our model captures common compu-
tational mechanisms across several anticipatory emotional phe-
nomena, such as dread, the anticipation of regret, and the (mis)
judgment of how happy or sad we will be in the future. The core 
mechanism is the anticipation of internal, cognitive, and emo-
tional states, in particular those associated with the more salient 
real states that one expects to face in the future. In turn, these 
anticipations assume a value themselves, and elicit associated pre-
feelings. However, anticipatory emotions can be extremely variable, 
ranging from fear associated with a future punishment to complex 
emotions involving personality and social and cultural aspects, such 
as frustration over being unable to pursue a goal, the shame of 
being exposed in public, and the sense of impotence in the face of 
death; in this case, anticipation involves a constellation of cognitive 
and hedonic states, (see, e.g., Castelfranchi and Miceli, 2011). For 
this reason, applying our model to all these circumstances requires 
making specific assumptions about which environmental, cogni-
tive, and emotional states are represented and anticipated during 
planning and their associated valence.
Furthermore, it is still unclear in which circumstances and to 
what extent the ability to anticipate emotional, motivational, and 
cognitive processes affects decision-making. In this regard, it is 
worth noting that our model accounts for anticipation of both 
negative and positive emotions. However, although clear results 
have emerged for dread, it is currently unclear whether symmetrical 
effects exist in the case of anticipated rewards. In this regard, some 
studies have detected anticipatory activity in the ventral striatum 
and the orbitofrontal cortex during expectancy of rewards; nev-
ertheless, it is difficult to ascertain whether this activity depends 
on time delays (Breiter et al., 2001). Furthermore, it is still unclear 
whether dread is present during the anticipation of punishments 
that are more complex than electric shocks, such as monetary losses.
4.3 DISCUSSION
In this section, we have presented a theoretical and computational 
model of how the ability to anticipate emotions and cognitive pro-
cesses influences choice. Specifically, we have focused on a par-
ticular case that has been widely studied, namely, dread. Different 
from previous mathematical characterizations aimed at behavioral 
description (Loewenstein, 1987), we have focused on the possible 
computational mechanisms behind this phenomenon, and have 
related them to neural processes. In particular, we have argued that 
dread depends on anticipation of future cognitive and emotional 
processes, such as continuous attention to the future shock (asso-
ciated with the posterior cingulate cortex and posterior insula), 
which – once anticipated – produces a prospect of negative future 
pre-feelings (connected to SI and SII). Both processes are propor-
tional to time delay of the shock.
Our model permits advancing some specific hypotheses about 
dread. First, because we described the anticipation of cognitive 
processes, such as attention, as an important feature of the model, 
we hypothesize that the effect of dread should not be present when 
an agent cannot anticipate those cognitive processes, or when it 
thinks that attention will be focused on other information. Second, 
we hypothesize that both lesions of the posterior cingulate cortex 
and the posterior insula, on one hand, and SI and SII, on the other 
hand, may impair dread effects. However, as we believe that the 
activation of the former causes the activation of the latter, we expect 
that during anticipation of punishment lesioning of the posterior 
cingulate cortex and the posterior insula may prevent the activation 
of SI and SII, but not vice versa. Third, we argue that the differ-
ence between extreme and mild dreaders might be linked to the 
ability to modulate perception through attention, connected with 
the functioning of the posterior cingulate cortex. Indeed, subjects 
that are more able to enhance or attenuate perceptive stimuli via 
attention might be more prone to dread, because they anticipate 
paying more attention to outcomes, increasing activation of the 
posterior cingulate cortex (Villemure and Bushnell, 2002). In this 
case, having weaker prospection abilities might mitigate the effects 
FIGURE 8 | Experiment 4. (A) T-maze. (B) Results, “going right” = red; “going left” = green.
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5.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR NEUROECONOMY
The possibility to use computational models to connect formal 
methods in economics and machine learning with neural descrip-
tions, and to use the former to derive predictions for the latter, is one 
of the strengths of the new field of neuroeconomy (Glimcher and 
Rustichini, 2004; Glimcher et al., 2009), which is also connected to a 
large body of studies in computational motor control (Kording and 
Wolpert, 2006; TrommershŠuser, 2009; Diedrichsen et al., 2010). So 
far, however, most studies in neuroeconomy have focused on tasks 
that involve model-free controllers associated with habitual com-
ponents of behavior, leveraging on the striking similarities between 
learning signals in the brain and formal methods used in machine 
learning. For instance, it has been noted that temporal difference 
learning signals used in model-free methods of RL (Sutton and 
Barto, 1998) have characteristics that are similar to the burst pattern 
of striatal dopamine neurons (Schultz et al., 1997).
It has been proposed, however, that although model-free 
methods adequately describe habitual behavior, the more flexible 
mechanisms underlying goal-directed choice are better formalized 
using model-based methods. This analysis suggests the importance 
of pursuing a new perspective in neuroeconomic experiments that 
focuses on goal-directed decision-making and aims at formally 
describing its neural mechanisms. Indeed, the neural underpin-
nings of model-based methods (associated with goal-directed con-
trollers) are not completely known (but see Glascher et al., 2010; 
Simon and Daw, 2011). A key element distinguishing model-based 
from model-free methods is that the former learn and use explicit 
state predictions; however, it is still unknown which tasks require 
explicit state predictions and which can be accomplished also with 
model-free methods. We believe that studying the more flexible, 
goal-directed forms of decision-making is an important goal for 
future research and that this research initiative could benefit from 
a cross-fertilization of neuroscience and model-based machine 
learning methods, as in studies using model-free methods.
In keeping with this view, the models we have proposed extend 
the model-based computational framework of Botvinick and collab-
orators (Botvinick and An, 2008; Solway and Botvinick,  submitted; 
the baseline model) with future-directed actions, such as the ability 
to anticipate future cognitive processes during planning. In particu-
lar, we have added two components, a motivational forward model 
and a mechanism for generating and evaluating imaginary states, 
both of which explicitly represent future states, that is, internal and 
imagined states and associated utilities. In other words, prospec-
tion abilities are represented as model-based processes. We hypoth-
esize that a model-based implementation of prospection abilities 
is advantageous for agents that act in complex environments in 
which rewards are volatile. Although model-free models are also 
capable of learning future-oriented actions, they produce rigid out-
puts and exploit a slow trial-and-error learning procedure, which 
requires a stable environment. Furthermore, during the learning 
of future-oriented actions, model-free models collect the learning 
signal (reward or punishment) with a delay with respect to when the 
action is executed, and it is unclear how the brain solves the credit 
assignment problem necessary to reinforce remote actions. For this 
reason, we argue that future-oriented actions that are so flexible, 
rapidly learned, and ready for use in volatile environments are likely 
to depend on model-based computations (see Pezzulo, 2007, 2011 
for a discussion of implicit and explicit predictions).
5 CONCLUSION
In this article, we have presented a theoretical and computational 
proposal on how prospection abilities in human and (at least 
partially) non-human animals affect decision-making, focusing 
on the role of anticipation of cognitive processes, motivations, 
and emotions. It is still not clear which computational mecha-
nisms the brain exploits in these processes. We have proposed 
that, in general, the anticipation of future cognitive processes 
influences decision-making via two processes: first, the value of 
future outcomes is weighted in relation to the internal context 
at the time of the occurrence of those outcomes; second, future 
internal states are treated as outcomes, hence a value is directly 
assigned to them.
We have investigated the general issue of prospection abili-
ties in two specific problems, namely, the anticipation of moti-
vation and dread. In our model of anticipated motivation, 
we propose a mechanism that represents future motivational 
states and future potential rewards and permits determining 
the latter based on prediction of the former. In our model of 
dread, we propose that anticipating future attention toward 
an unavoidable shock and associated pre-feelings may lead 
people to choose to receive punishment as soon as possible. 
However, the framework we have proposed is more general in 
that it describes how the anticipation of contextual factors and 
of internal variables can influence decision-making. For this 
reason, we believe that the mechanisms we have described so 
far apply to a wide range of phenomena linked to prospection 
abilities, such as the anticipation (and evaluation) of ones 
own emotional states following a decision. In this respect, our 
model can be considered as an extension of EUT that takes 
psychological considerations into account and uses them in 
the utility-maximization process.
Assigning utility in view of future cognitive processes is a com-
plex ability, which has been linked to concepts such as prospec-
tion and mental time travel. Further investigations are necessary to 
identify the circumstances in which the complex decision-making 
strategies we have discussed (as opposed to simpler, myopic alterna-
tives suggested in earlier RL studies) are really used. Furthermore, it 
is still unclear whether or not non-human animals have prospection 
abilities, and if they do use similar brain mechanisms (Raby et al., 
2007; Clayton et al., 2009).
Regarding which brain mechanisms underlie prospection abili-
ties, we propose a common neural implementation of anticipated 
motivational, cognitive, and emotional processes. This mechanism 
has two components: the former one related to prospect explo-
ration, and the other related to value assignment. First, during 
planning, frontal areas, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
the cingulate cortex, and the hippocampus may be responsible 
for the anticipation of future cognitive processes related to pros-
pects. In turn, these areas may activate cortico-limbic and sensory 
structures, such as the amygdala, the orbitofrontal cortex, and the 
somatosensory cortex (SI and SII in the case of dread), related to 
imagined feelings and emotions associated with the anticipation of 
future cognitive processes, thus assigning utility to those processes. 
Although this view is speculative, it has generated some specific 
testable hypotheses and, indeed, some findings are in accordance 
with it (Breiter et al., 2001; Berns et al., 2006; van der Meer and 
Redish, 2010).
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or replaced by Pavlovian processes, which drive innate responses 
that can produce undesired effects (Daw et al., 2005; Niv et al., 
2006; Rangel et al., 2008; Dayan, 2009). Furthermore, the condi-
tions in which the competition of multiple controllers is adaptive 
(Livnat and Pippenger, 2006) or maladaptive (Dayan et al., 2006) 
are still unknown. Elucidating the interactions between multi-
ple controllers, and the resulting effects for (optimal) behavior, 
remains as an open objective for future research.
6 THE MODEL OF ANTICIPATED MOTIVATION AND EUT
Botvinick and An (2008) demonstrated that the inferential method 
adopted in the baseline model guarantees maximization of expected 
utility. In this section, we show how EUT concepts and procedures 
adopted to maximize expected utility are translated in our model of 
anticipated motivation, which introduces additional elements with 
respect to the baseline model (This is unnecessary for our second 
model, in which the way utilities are assigned and maximized is 
not substantially different from the baseline model). Specifically, we 
are going to explain how scalar rewards are assigned and mapped 
into conditional probability distributions in our model and how 
finding the policy that maximizes expected utility corresponds to 
reward query, the method adopted in the baseline model and our 
model to infer the optimal policy.
Consider i
t
 node as a stochastic variable representing the moti-
vational state at time 0 < t ≤ T. Each value of i
t
 is x
ij
 ∈ xt, such that 
0 ≤ x
ij
 ≥ X
max
, where X
max
 > 0 is the maximum motivational need. 
The corresponding detection node represents the variable d
t
. Each 
value of d
t
, y
tk
 ∈ yt  such that 0 ≤ ytk ≥ Xmax, represents the value of 
the potential reward detected. Given all combinations of values (i
t
, 
d
t
), it is possible to compute the scalar reward vector R
t
, as defined 
within the EUT framework. It is also possible to compute p(u
t
 = 1/
i
t
,d
t
), the conditional probability distribution of binary node u
t
, as 
represented in our model. Thus, ∀ j ∈ J and ∀ k ∈ K:
if y x R i d x p u i x d y x Xtk tj tjk tj tk tj t t tj t tk tj max≥ , , , / , /( ) = = = =( ) =1
 (4)
if y x R i d y p u i x d y y Xtk tj tjk tj tk tk t t tj t tk tk max< , , , / , /( ) = = = =( ) =1  
 (5)
From the previous equation it is easy to see that:
p u i d R t Tt t t t=( ) ∝ ∀ < ≤1 0/ , ,  (6)
Suppose that a certain number of motivational systems are 
implemented, hence there are M nodes i
m
 and d
m
 at each time step. 
Also in this case, scalar rewards and conditional probabilities of u
m
 
are calculated as in Eqs 4 and 5 for each motivational system. We 
know that, in sequential decisions, being the present state (i
0
, d
0
) 
at t = 0, EUT defines expected utility at time T, given policy p, as 
depending on future Rewards:
U i d E R i d
t
T
mt mt
m
M
p
0 0
1 1
, ,( ) = ( )

= =∑ ∑  (7)
where E is the expectancy, or the probability of obtaining rewards. 
Note that in the previous equation the discounting factor is g = 1. 
From EUT, we know that maximizing expected utility corresponds 
with choosing the optimal policy, which we call p
optEU
:
Overall, we have proposed a formal framework for studying 
prospection abilities and their influence on decision-making within 
a model-based approach. Specifically, in this study decision-making 
is framed as a (computational and neural) process aimed at maxi-
mizing the probability of expected utility using model-based meth-
ods. The first implication of this view is that phenomena such as the 
choice to receive punishments as early as possible (Berns et al., 2006) 
should not be considered as violations of the utility-maximization 
process, but should be considered within a formal framework that 
extends EUT with the effects of prospection.
Besides a computational-level description of how optimization 
of reward can incorporate prospection abilities, the use of proba-
bilistic models permits making explicit claims about their mecha-
nistic implementation in the brain. In this sense, our models have 
implications at the psychological and neural levels, which mainly 
concern the factorization of the state space, the causal relations 
among variables, the use of explicit representations of (internal, 
imagined) states and associated values to implement prospection 
abilities, as well as the nature of dynamics of the computations 
performed (e.g., the reward query). Although our knowledge is still 
incomplete regarding the neural underpinnings of the processes we 
have described, our model could help in formulating hypotheses, 
as in the work of Botvinick and An, (2008), Solway and Botvinick 
(submitted).
Another assumption, which is common of Bayesian systems, is 
that the brain encodes relevant variables, such as state and action 
variables, probabilistically (Doya et al., 2007). All these assumptions 
deserve rigorous empirical validation through novel experimental 
paradigms that explore anticipatory dynamics during choice.
In keeping with the baseline model, we have adopted a “reward 
query” and exact Bayesian inference to describe how computa-
tions are performed. As discussed in Botvinick and An’s (2008) 
study, this method guarantees maximization of expected util-
ity (see Section 6 for a discussion of how our extensions of the 
model maintain the same characteristics). Although this prop-
erty is appealing and has the advantage of linking our model to 
mathematical descriptions of EUT, which are more common in 
neuroeconomy, prudence is necessary to apply this normative 
model to real-world economic scenarios. Indeed, many factors 
could limit optimality in these situations. First, the quality of 
choice depends on the knowledge available to the decision-maker. 
Uncertain or limited knowledge potentially leads to sub-maxi-
mal decisions or choosing exploration rather than exploitation 
(Cohen et al., 2007). Furthermore, it is likely that prospection 
involves the simulation of few salient events or the elicitation of 
incomplete and erroneous simulations, and this limits the amount 
of (future) knowledge incorporated in decision-making. Second, 
the need to use bounded computational and cognitive resources 
can lead to sub-optimal use of available knowledge. Note that 
this does not necessarily mean that the Bayesian scheme is inap-
plicable; a possible alternative, which is currently pursued in 
many studies, is to explain these phenomena using approximate 
rather than exact Bayesian inferences (Chater et al., 2006; Daw 
and Courville, 2008; Sanborn et al., 2010; Dindo et al., 2011). 
Finally, a recent view is that decision-making and behavior result 
from the interaction between different controllers. In some cir-
cumstances goal-directed and habitual controllers, which tend to 
optimize performance (using different methods), are influenced 
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